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Introduction
Structured human rights dialogues (HRDs) 
were introduced as part of the broader EU 
democratisation policy towards Central 
Asian states after the adoption of the 
‘EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a New 
Partnership’ in June 2007. The dialogues 
are conducted on a bilateral basis with each 
of the five Central Asian republics. As with 
the human rights dialogues established by 
the EU with a number of other countries, 
the HRDs with the Central Asian states 
are designed to ‘discuss questions of 
mutual interest and enhance cooperation 
on human rights, inter alia in multilateral 
arena such as the United Nations and the 
OSCE’ as well as to ‘raise the concerns felt 
by the EU on human rights in the countries 
concerned, gather information and launch 
initiatives to improve the relevant human 
rights situation.’1
The structured HRDs include formal 
meetings of (usually senior and/or mid-
level) human rights officials of the European 
Commission,2 Council Secretariat,3 and 
the EU Presidency4 with representatives 
1. European Union Factsheet: EU Human Rights 
Dialogues in Central Asia, http://www.eeas.europa.
eu/central_asia/docs/factsheet_hr_dialogue_en.pdf
2. Before the Lisbon Treaty’s entry into force, 
representatives of the DG RELEX, Human Rights 
Unit.
3. E.g. at the level of the Head of the Human Rights 
Unit of the Council Secretariat.
4. Before the Lisbon Treaty, with the incumbent 
presidency in the position of chair. 
of relevant departments 5 of the Central 
Asian republics. The meetings should be 
held once a year, alternately in Brussels 
and in the countries involved. In addition, 
the dialogues seek to involve human rights 
activists, NGO members, and academia 
representatives from both Europe and 
Central Asia through civil society seminars 
held in between the official HRD sessions 
and funded under the European Instrument 
for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). 
By the end of 2010, four official rounds 
of dialogues had been conducted with 
Uzbekistan, three rounds with Kazakhstan 
and Turkmenistan, and two rounds with 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.6 Over 2008-
2009, one civil society seminar was 
organised in each of the Central Asian 
republics, except for Turkmenistan, and a 
regional seminar with participants from all 
the five states was held in Brussels in 2010.
This policy brief reviews and evaluates 
the performance of the dialogues to 
date, paying specific attention to the 
shortcomings of the existing practices, and 
provides recommendations for what could 
be improved with regard to HRD planning 
and procedures. 
5. Usually ministers or deputy ministers of the 
interior and justice, but representatives of law 
enforcement agencies, general prosecutor’s offices 
and ombudspersons are also occasionally present. 
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Official dialogue sessions        
The EU-Uzbekistan HRD held within the framework of the 
Subcommittee on Justice and Home Affairs, Human Rights and 
Related Issues, was the first one to be officially established in 
2007 after the preparatory negotiations, which had started in 
2006 (before the adoption of the ‘Strategy for a New Partnership’), 
in response to the Andijan May 2005 events. The launch of the 
structured HRDs between the EU and the other four republics 
followed in 2008 with the first official sessions conducted with 
Turkmenistan in June and with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan in October 2008.7 
The official sessions include several hours of intensive, focused 
discussions on human rights issues. The adoption of an 
agenda for each round of HRD follows a standard procedure 
of preliminary exchange of notes between the European 
Commission’s Delegation on the ground and the respective 
ministry of foreign affairs on the issues to be possibly discussed 
during the official dialogue. The discussions usually cover the 
general human rights situation and specific developments in the 
country concerned. At times, European experts offer thematic 
presentations on the ‘best practices’ in the EU (e.g. abolition of 
the death penalty or ‘habeas corpus’), and representatives of the 
respective Central Asian government present (follow-up) reports 
on the recent HR-related developments in the country, which are 
subsequently discussed in an open debate. 
In addition to the discussions on the general human rights 
situation, the EU normally raises a number of individual cases 
with regard to protection of human rights defenders against 
arbitrary treatment by the authorities in the countries concerned. 
A list with the names of individuals8 currently detained or who 
have their rights limited on politically-motivated grounds is 
handed over by the European representatives to the respective 
Central Asian government officials with the expectation that 
the cases will be followed-up. Apart from that, human rights 
developments in UN forums (with the focus on the Universal 
Periodic Review) and in the Organisation for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) are discussed during the HRD 
rounds. The Uzbek government has only agreed to participate 
in the dialogue if it is based on the principle of equality thus 
criticising the European human rights track-record. With the 
other Central Asian republics this is normally not the case.
Civil society involvement
In accordance with the EU general guidelines on human rights 
dialogues, providing for a possibility of involvement of European 
and third country’s civil society,9 the Commission organises 
civil society seminars in between the official dialogue sessions. 
At the seminars human rights activists, NGO members and 
academia representatives from the Central Asian republics 
meet with their European colleagues in the presence of EU 
and respective national government officials (as observers) 
to discuss specific areas of concern and prepare detailed 
recommendations for the official dialogue. Procedurally, 
7. Notably, in 2005-2007, an ad hoc EU-Turkmenistan human rights 
dialogue was undertaken in the margins of the Joint Committee meeting 
under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement.
8. E.g. human rights defenders, activists, journalists, and their family 
members.
9. EU Guidelines on Human Rights Dialogues with Third Countries, http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms
Upload/16526.en08.pdf
the seminars present a mixture of plenary speeches, panel 
discussions and workshop sessions. 
Initially, the issues in focus of the civil society seminars were 
supposed to be country-specific. Thus, the topic of the first 
EU-Uzbek seminar on 2-3 October 2008 was ‘Liberalisation of 
mass media – an important component of the democratisation 
of society’. By comparison, ‘Co-operation to protect and 
promote children’s and prisoners’ rights’ was discussed during 
the first civil society seminar with Kyrgyzstan on 5-6 March 
2009. The topics of the seminars are usually proposed by the 
European Commission, not by the participating civil society 
representatives, and are negotiated with the respective Central 
Asian government, often a lengthy and technocratic process. 
Similarly, the potential participants are suggested by the 
Commission, which offers a list of European civil society 
organisations (CSOs) and experts to take part in the seminars, 
and the respective Central Asian government, which provides a 
list of local civil society representatives.
Originally, the idea was to organise civil society seminars annually 
with all five countries on a bilateral basis. Yet, in the course of 
implementation, several changes have been introduced. After the 
first seminar round with Uzbekistan in 2008, bilateral seminars 
were organised with Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan in 
March, June and July 2009 respectively. However, there was no 
civil society seminar with Uzbekistan in 2009 and no seminars 
with Turkmenistan in 2008-2009. The reason for this lies in the 
failure of the first civil society seminar held in Uzbekistan, which 
turned out to be a negative experience for both Uzbek and 
European sides. The participating European (mainly Brussels-
based) human rights NGOs expressed harsh critique towards 
the human rights situation particularly with regard to the lack 
of freedom for mass media in Uzbekistan. The Uzbek side was 
represented by government operated NGOs, which responded 
by presenting essentially positive statistics and progressive 
developments in the country. This left no room for a serious, 
constructive discussion and eventually led to the cancellation of 
the seminar with Uzbekistan in 2009.
This experience was taken into account by the Commission 
when organising the subsequent rounds of seminars in Central 
Asia with regard to both topics proposed for discussion and 
potential participants. Thus, considering the absence of state-
independent CSOs in Turkmenistan, a decision was taken not 
to organise a civil society seminar in this country, since it would 
have led to the same (negative) results as in Uzbekistan. 
Another conclusion drawn from the experience of the first 
civil society seminar was the switch to a regional approach 
in the EU relation with the Central Asian non-governmental 
actors. Thus, there were no separate seminar rounds in 
2010. Instead, a regional ‘EU-Central Asia Civil Seminar on 
Women’s Rights’ was organised. This year, one of the three 
scheduled civil society seminars will be held in the same 
regional format. 
The European Commission also organises ‘closed’ pre- and 
post-dialogue briefings with the European (primarily Brussels-
based) NGOs at home with the purpose of information sharing 
and exchange. The NGOs are consulted with regard to the 
issues to be discussed during the official dialogue rounds 
and civil society seminars, availability of state-independent 
NGOs in the Central Asian republics (e.g. local partners 
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of the European NGOs), and the ongoing cases of political 
prisoners in the respective countries. 
Interactions between the European Commission and Central 
Asian civil society actors are rather rare and ad hoc. There are no 
regular consultations comparable with the briefings in Brussels. 
Yet, there are attempts to organise meetings with independent 
civil society representatives shortly before the official dialogue 
rounds (e.g. to follow-up on the recommendations developed 
during the civil society seminars). Such meetings are usually 
prepared by the EU presence on the ground.10 Thus, before 
the second round of the official HRD with Kyrgyzstan in 2009, a 
video-conference was held with Kyrgyz and international NGOs 
representatives. In the case of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, 
it is impossible to organise such conferences or meetings with 
independent civil society actors.11  
Evaluating the dialogues 
Evaluating human rights dialogues is difficult. Despite the EU’s 
own guidelines for HRDs, stating that ‘[a]ny decision to open 
a human rights dialogue will first require the defining of the 
practical aims which the Union seeks to achieve by entering into 
dialogue with the country concerned’,12 no specific objectives of 
the EU HRDs with the Central Asian republics are pronounced. 
Apart from the very general aims formulated in the European 
Commission’s Factsheet on EU Human Rights Dialogues in 
Central Asia,13 no public EU document contains more specific 
objectives or benchmarks. The Commission prepares internal 
(unpublished) priority papers for each Central Asian HRD 
partner, which encloses more detailed expectations of what can 
be achieved within each dialogue round. Yet, no benchmarks 
are included in these internal documents either. Conversations 
with EU officials have revealed reluctance toward setting public 
benchmarks, because it is perceived as an alienating approach. 
To highlight this reference is commonly made to the case of the 
EU-Iran human rights dialogue, for which the EU formulated 
public benchmarks in 2004, after which the dialogue eventually 
froze.
The absence of clear objectives is problematic, considering the 
EU guidelines for HRDs that call for ‘assessing the situation [the 
human rights situation in the country concerned] in relation to the 
objectives which the Union set itself before the start of the dialogue’ 
and examining ‘how much added value has been provided by the 
dialogue’.14 According to the guidelines, such assessment may 
be conducted by the Presidency and the Council Secretariat, 
involving civil society, with the progress regularly discussed by 
the Working Party on Human Rights (COHOM) together with the 
10. In the case of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the European Commission’s 
delegation offices (subordinate to the delegation in Kazakhstan), have been 
upgraded to full-fledged embassies. As there are still no EU embassies in 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the Europa Houses or the individual member 
state embassies are the only European representations there.
11. The unofficial contacts with Uzbek and Turkmen human rights activists 
are either supported through member state embassies and European NGOs 
offices/partners on the ground or through members of diaspora.
12. EU Guidelines on Human Rights Dialogues with Third Countries, http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms
Upload/16526.en08.pdf 
13. European Union Factsheet: EU Human Rights Dialogues in Central Asia, 
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/central_asia/docs/factsheet_hr_dialogue_en.pdf
14. EU Guidelines on Human Rights Dialogues with Third Countries, http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/16526.en08.pdf
geographical working parties, the Working Party on Development 
Cooperation (CODEV) and the Committee on measures for the 
development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, 
and for the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
As interviews with the EU officials have revealed, the internal 
discussions in fact take place on a regular basis as part of 
preparation/follow-up for dialogues. Yet, they are limited to the 
COHOM and the relevant geographical working party – COEST. 
No extensive study on the implementation and effects of the 
HRDs with the Central Asian countries has been conducted (or 
is planned) so far. The absence of clearly defined objectives and 
assessment mechanisms creates an impression of poor strategic 
planning of the human rights dialogues. 
The recommendations elaborated during the civil society 
seminars are commonly presented and followed up by the EU 
and Central Asian representatives during the official HRD rounds. 
During the EU-Kyrgyzstan 2009 dialogue session, the Kyrgyz 
side proposed to prepare a national action plan based on the 
civil society recommendations in the sphere of children’s and 
prisoners’ rights. However, according to the Council officials, as 
there had been no further HRD session with Kyrgyzstan since 
October 2009, it was impossible for them to follow-up on the 
development of the action plan. Although implementation of the 
civil society recommendations are supposed to be monitored by 
the EU delegations on the ground and (formerly) by the relevant 
officials of the Commission’s DG RELEX, apparently there has 
been no functioning mechanism for distributing and coordinating 
this information within the EU. 
Specific cases of HR violations are raised and controversial 
issues are addressed directly in the dialogues  during the official 
HRD rounds, which are held behind the closed doors. In the case 
of the civil society seminars, which are held in a more open-for-
public setting, there is a general tendency towards opting for 
‘softer’, less controversial issues, especially after the failure of 
the first seminar with Uzbekistan. This is explained firstly by the 
impossibility of discussing ‘hard’ cases of human rights violations 
with Central Asian civil society representatives without putting 
them at risk, and secondly by the necessity to open up the general 
discussion first to be able to get to the ‘harder’ issues later, as 
insisting on ‘hard’ human rights-related issues from the very 
beginning might ‘kill’ the dialogue. This confirms that the EU has 
learnt its lessons after the first civil society seminar with regard to 
the possible negative consequences of politicising human rights 
in a public setting. 
The lesson-learning has, however, not accounted for the 
potential side effects of the human rights dialogues themselves. 
Participating in the HRDs, Central Asian governments might 
be unwilling to discuss human rights issues in other formats, 
e.g. within the framework of political dialogue with the EU or 
its member states. The same is true for the EU member state 
officials avoiding human rights questions during their security 
or trade related meetings with the Central Asian government 
representatives, which is justified by the existence of the HRD as 
a specific platform for raising human rights concerns. This results 
in severe policy inconsistencies within the EU and undermines 
its credibility. Another danger is that Central Asian governments 
may use the HRD to claim their commitment to human rights on 
a rhetorical level without introducing actual improvements. This 
situation should not satisfy the European Union. 
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These and other shortcomings of the HRD process need to 
be addressed, for instance through considering the following 
recommendations:
• A more strategic approach towards HRDs with the Central 
Asian republics needs to be developed, including specifying 
objectives for each year’s dialogue round, which should 
be publicly available and formulated as explicit outcome 
expectations. Setting conditions that need to be fulfilled 
for the dialogues to proceed would not be recommendable 
though, as this would be perceived by Central Asian officials 
as an intrusive or even hostile measure. 
• Human rights dialogues are by no means an adequate 
instrument for exerting pressure through conditionality or 
benchmarking, especially in the Central Asian context, as 
the leverage of the EU is not sufficient for this in the region. 
The purpose of the HRDs is rather information exchange and 
confidence building with the final aim of the human rights 
norms diffusion. An approach labelled ‘soft but persistent 
insistence’ would be thus more apt. Such an approach 
involves first focussing on country specific issues that are 
perceived as less sensitive and are more feasible to achieve 
a change. This would allow establishing a level of credibility 
between the EU and Central Asian governments, which 
would enable opening up more sensitive/harder issues at a 
later stage.
• Credibility-building implies, in turn, the need for an equality-
based approach, i.e. symmetrical dialogue, focusing not only 
on the human rights situations in the Central Asian republics, 
but also on HR developments in the EU Member States, 
including problematic issues and how they have been dealt 
with so far by the EU and its Member States. For this, a 
pool of relevant European experts could be created, who 
would be brought in for consultations during the official HRD 
sessions. This approach might also bring the Central Asian 
states closer to the Council of Europe, a process that has 
already started in the case of Kazakhstan.
• A more enhanced and systematic engagement with Central 
Asian civil society representatives is needed within and 
beyond the HRD process. Yet, this engagement should 
assume a careful differentiated approach, taking account 
of the distinct developments in the civil society sectors of 
the five countries. Thus, in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan, where the first round of civil society seminars 
resulted in a range of constructive recommendations, a more 
effective follow-up mechanism for monitoring of the progress 
on the recommendations should be established. It must be 
also ensured that specific suggestions for the EU, including 
seminars-related organisational issues, as inputs from civil 
society are accounted for. 
• A strategic approach towards human rights dialogues 
implies a comprehensive assessment of what has been 
achieved through the HRDs since their launch. It would be 
recommendable to initiate a research exercise, including 
a context study of Central Asian states (to reveal the local 
conditions for potential success of the dialogues) and the 
HRDs’ impact to date, but also a comparative study of the 
HRDs’ effects in other (non-Central Asian) states. This would 
serve to determine the future approach, specify the objectives 
and introduce necessary changes to the HRD procedures. 
Such a research project could involve both European and 
Central Asian experts, which would serve the purpose of 
enhancing the participatory approach to evaluation and 
strengthen the dialogue between the European and Central 
Asian research communities.
• Finally, in order to avoid policy inconsistencies within the 
EU, a functional mechanism needs to be established to 
coordinate the EU efforts within the structured HRDs and 
the other forms of political dialogue, including bilateral 
dialogues between the member states and the Central 
Asian republics. This mechanism could operate at the 
Foreign Affairs Council level ensuring the member states’ 
endorsement of the HRDs’ objectives and their ownership 
of the process. 
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• Expand the network of experts and institutions from European countries 
and Central Asian states and provide a forum to debate on European-Central 
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with the Karelian Institute and CEPS, with the support of the Open Society 
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